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THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL 
NARRATIVES IN EXTREMIST 
PROPAGANDA
Alastair Reed,  Jennifer Dowling
Abstract
The aim of  this paper is to examine the role of  historical narratives in extremist 
propaganda, seeking to show how and why they are used to enhance the impact 
of  such propaganda. To that end we use the concept of  the ‘competitive system 
of  meaning’, which lies at the heart of  extremist propaganda and forms their 
grand overarching narrative. Through the use of  two constructs, in-group/out-
group identity and crisis/solution, propagandists form a cylindrically reinforcing 
narrative. This paper is exploratory in nature, and is envisaged as the first 
step in much more detailed research into the role of  historical narratives in 
extremist propaganda. It seeks to show the importance of  historical narratives 
to propaganda by identifying and exploring five ways in which such narratives 
are exploited to reinforce the extremists’ ‘competitive system of  meaning’.
Keywords—terrorism, violent extremism, propaganda, strategic communications
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Introduction
History is a powerful weapon, and some of  the fiercest battles are fought over how 
it is interpreted. Although extremist groups are fighting in the present, historical 
narratives are often used to justify their ongoing causes, and as a result feature 
prominently in their propaganda output.1 A phenomenon that has been highlighted 
in recent years in the extensive propaganda output of  the Islamic State (IS). At 
the heart of  Islamic State propaganda is the notion that the Muslim world is in 
crisis—facing an existential struggle for survival against the West. Throughout their 
propaganda they connect the current conflict to historic struggles with the West 
from the crusades to colonisation. Thereby they strengthen the sense of  crisis, by 
presenting it as an ongoing and never-ending conflict. Conversely, the solution they 
propose, a return to the Caliphate, is also drawn from the past. The use of  historical 
narratives to strengthen propaganda is, however, not unique to IS, or even to other 
militant Islamist groups. Other groups with different ideological, motivational, and 
operational tactics, from a national to a supra-national view, also rely heavily on 
history as justification across their propaganda. A central feature of  The Provisional 
IRA’s multi-dimensioned communication strategy,2 with its republican, nationalist 
agenda, was the consistent reiteration that the centuries of  British oppression and 
occupation were the root cause of  the ‘Irish problem’. The ultimate removal of  
the foreign force was seen as the only solution to their perpetual crisis. Likewise, 
far-right groups, such as the Christian-identity movement, stake their foundation 
and justification on historical narratives and extensive biblical genealogies, to justify 
their in-group/out-group dynamic and the history of  conflict between the groups. 
Across the whole spectrum of  diverse and different extremist groups, historical 
narratives are often prominent in their propaganda. The question this paper seeks to 
ask is: How and why is history used in extremist propaganda? 
1 The term propaganda has many negative connotations, but is used pragmatically in this paper to refer to 
messaging designed to influence the behaviour and attitudes of  a target audience to achieve politico-military 
ends during conflict.
2 John Horgan and Max Taylor, ‘The provisional Irish republican army: Command and functional structure’, 
in Terrorism and Political Violence 9 (3)(1997): 1–32 ; In this article the authors praise the Provisional IRA for 
the group’s publicity wing, which formed an intrinsic part of  the  group’s advanced command and functional 
structure. 
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This paper aims to examine the role of  historical narratives used in propaganda 
by extremist groups, looking beyond mere justification, to see how and why they 
are used to enhance the impact of  such propaganda. How are historical narratives 
deployed as a communication technique in extremist propaganda? This paper uses 
the concept of  the ‘competitive system of  meaning’, which, lying at the heart of  
extremist propaganda, forms their grand overarching narrative through the use of  
in-group/out-group identity and crisis/solution constructs to form a cylindrically 
reinforcing narrative. It seeks to identify five ways in which historical narratives are 
exploited to re-inforce the extremists’ ‘competitive system of  meaning’. First, crisis 
expansion—connecting current events to greater historical trajectories to magnify 
the depth and resonance of  the ‘crisis’. Second, solution support—using historical 
narratives to strengthen the case for the proposed ‘solution’. Third, deepening 
the in-group/out-group dynamic—exacerbating the distinction between group 
identities and demonstrating that this is the result of  a larger historical trend. Fourth, 
group legitimacy—drawing on history for cultural appropriation to bolster the claim 
to legitimacy. And finally, justification—using historical prophecies to connect the 
present to the future and generate motivation for action.
As this research is explorative, looking into the role historical narratives play in 
extremist propaganda, rather than focusing on the propaganda used by one particular 
group, this paper will draw on examples from across a variety of  extremist groups.3 
We will explore examples from three different types of  groups, chosen primarily 
for their illustrative nature. The groups whose propaganda we analyse include: 
militant Islamist groups (al-Qaeda, Islamic State), a national-separatist group (the 
Provisional IRA), and right-wing extremists (Nazi, Christian Identity). It is crucial 
to note that these groups vary in almost every aspect—ideology, motivation, and 
operational level—and are not comparable beyond the use of  historical narratives in 
their propaganda. We selected them primarily because they demonstrate compelling 
examples of  the use of  historical narratives in propaganda, each in its own distinct 
way; and second, for their differences, to highlight that this technique is used by the 
broadest spectrum of  groups and movements. The objective here is to demonstrate 
the role that historical narratives play across extremist propaganda, regardless of  
ideology and motivation. Whilst the five ways historical narratives are exploited in 
propaganda outlined above are invariably employed by many extremist groups, 
the examples chosen here have been selected simply for their explanatory value, 
3 Given the scope of  this paper the narratives projected by the opponents’ of  these extremist groups’ narratives 
will not be explored, but could in the future be a suggestion for a similar analysis, as there have been numerous 
examples of  charismatic political leaders who have similarly drawn on historical narratives to construct and 
strengthen their political narratives. Such a comparative analysis would provide a more holistic understanding of  
the narratives being projected by these extremist groups being analysed in this paper. 
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not to demonstrate that they have a particular application by one or another 
type of  extremist group. Furthermore, it should be noted that this technique 
is not unique to extremist groups, and could be as equally prevalent in political 
rhetoric and government counter-messaging. We hope this paper provides 
the groundwork for more in-depth future research into the use of  historical 
narrative by individual groups, and potentially by their opponents as well.
What is the system of  meaning?
We build on frameworks of  analysis developed within the Counter-Terrorism 
Strategic Communications (CTSC) research project,4 in particular work by Dr 
Haroro Ingram and J.M. Berger. 
In his linkage-based approach, Ingram outlines a core structure based on two 
interlocking dichotomies at the heart of  extremist propaganda. Together they 
form a ‘competitive system of  meaning’ that brings the reader into an extremist 
world view and provides a lens through which to view and interpret the world 
as prescribed by a particular group. Although the scope of  the article does not 
allow us to go into detail, these groups use the interplay of  in-group/out-group 
identities and crisis/solution constructs, which are ‘linked’ together to create 
cyclically self-reinforcing narratives.5 
Figure 1. The cyclically reinforcing dynamic of  extremist propaganda6
4 For more information see: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Counter-Terrorism Strategic 
Communications (CTSC) Project.
5 Ingram, ‘Deciphering the Siren Call of  Militant Islamist Propaganda: Meaning, Credibility & Behavioural 
Change’, (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, September 2016).
6 Ingram, 2016
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We can see here a three step process: first, the in-group/out-group dichotomy 
construct is established; then come the dichotomous crisis/solution constructs; 
and finally the messages that connect the crisis to the out-group, and the solution 
to the in-group. What may appear to be disparate messaging across many subjects 
and types of  media, is in reality centered on deepening the two dichotomies 
and strengthening the connections, linking together and mutually reinforcing 
each other to provide the overarching grand narrative. Hence, Ingram calls his 
method the ‘linkage’ approach, referring to how the constructs that make up the 
system of  meaning are ‘linked’ together to create the core narrative. Identifying 
the links is the key to dissecting and understanding the core narrative.
In terms of  militant Islamist propaganda, Ingram summarises the core narrative 
as typically declaring: ‘we are the champions and protectors of  (appropriately 
aligned) Sunni Muslims (i.e. the in-group identity), everyone outside of  this 
narrow category are [sic] enemies (i.e. out-group identities) responsible for the 
ummah’s7 crises, so support us and our solutions (i.e. the in-group’s politico-
military agenda)’. Whilst the intricacies of  the in-group/out-group and crisis/
solution constructs may vary for different groups, the central dynamics remain 
roughly the same. As Ingram observes, this approach is not unique to militant 
Islamist propaganda; rather, a similarly constructed system of  meaning is at 
the heart of  most successful extremist propaganda, although imbued with the 
particulars of  the narrative of  each group’s cause. Indeed, as he explains ‘it is 
broadly echoed in [Mao] Tse-Tung’s (2000 [1937]) On Guerrilla Warfare, the 
Irish Republican Army’s (1985 [c.1950s]) Handbook for Volunteers, Guevara’s 
(2007 [1961]) Guerrilla Warfare and al-Muqrin’s (2009 [2003]) A Practical Course 
for Guerrilla War’.8
At the highest level, extremists link a specific out-group to a crisis or crises, 
and connect the in-group to solutions. But these high-level constructs can 
be unbundled into a series of  more complex links enhanced by a variety of  
propaganda strategies. This paper focuses specifically on historical narratives as 
a lever for effective propaganda.
The Power of  History
J.M. Berger builds on Ingram’s linkage approach to explore how such linkages 
can be ‘bundled together’ to form high-level constructs that forge a single idea. 
7 The term ummah is generally taken to mean the collective or overall community of  adherents to Islam.
8 Ingram, Haroro, ‘An Analysis of  Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine’, Australian Journal of  Political Science, Volume 
51, Issue 3 (2016): 458–77.
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Berger demonstrates how extremist propagandists package together multiple 
sources of  ‘evidence’ to create an apparently self-reinforcing argument that 
is presented as an historical ‘proof ’, which then is accepted as ‘the truth’ for a 
particular scenario. Narratives are constructed through combining historical events 
with folklore, mythology, religious scriptures, and symbolism, to create the illusion 
of  a sound argument. As Berger explains, an example of  such a bundle ‘would be 
an ideological argument that draws connections between a conspiracy theory, a 
scriptural reference, a folkloric tradition, and a real historical event, representing 
the bundled product simply as “history” ’.9 These bundles can then be linked with 
other bundles to construct highly complex, interconnected concepts that support 
an overarching narrative. Working backwards from a group’s core narrative, these 
concepts can be de-constructed by examining linkages and bundles to untangle 
the complex web that makes up the system of  meaning. We use this approach to 
identify how historical narratives are exploited to support the construction of  the 
system of  meaning at the heart of  extremist propaganda.
History, it is often said, is written by the winners, and some of  the fiercest 
battles are often over the interpretation of  history, and how its narratives are 
constructed. ‘History’ is used extensively by extremist propagandists as evidence 
to support their narratives, and the use of  such ‘historical evidence’ can have the 
false appearance of  scholarly rigour, which can add to the apparent persuasive 
power of  the narrative.
We will explore how historical narratives are used in extremist propaganda 
through the lens of  the system of  meaning, setting out five different ways in 
which historical narratives have been employed to enhance and reinforce the 
system of  meaning at the heart of  extremist propaganda.
Crisis Expansion
At the heart of  the crisis/solution dichotomy is the need to escalate the sense 
of  crisis. The greater the perception of  crisis the greater the call to action; and 
the greater the crisis the easier it is to justify extreme solutions, and so on. One 
way extremist propaganda has sought to increase the sense of  crisis is to stretch 
it beyond the here and now by connecting it to a wider historical struggle. 
Such manipulation presents the view that the extent of  the crisis transcends 
the current situation, which is merely the current manifestation of  an ongoing 
historical, and possibly existential, conflict. 
9 J. M. Berger, ‘Extremist Construction of  Identity: How Escalating Demands for Legitimacy Shape and Define In-
Group and Out-Group Dynamics’ Vol. 8, № 7 (2017) (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism).
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This connection of  past and present crises is particularly obvious in militant 
Islamist propaganda. Al-Qaeda and IS invariably refer to ‘the West’ generically 
as the ‘crusaders’ throughout their propaganda output. They seek to conflate the 
western Christian crusades, almost a millennium ago, with what they perceive 
as the war currently being waged on the Muslim world by the West. Using this 
narrative, IS portrayed the West’s campaign against their group in Syria as a 
continuation of  the crusades, writing for example in Dabiq: ‘It is yet another 
crusade just like the former crusades led by Richard the Lionheart, Barbarossa 
of  Germany, and Louis of  France. Likewise today, when Bush raised the cross, 
the crusader countries immediately scrambled.’10  
Narratives about the crusades of  the distant past are, in turn, woven together 
with narratives about Western colonialism in Muslim countries over the last few 
centuries, building to a perception of  the Muslim world in perpetual struggle against 
subjugation by ‘the West’. One of  IS’s most resonant videos from the period in 
which they rose to predominance was entitled ‘The End of  Sykes-Picot’,11 which 
featured IS fighters demolishing border posts between Syria and Iraq. The border, 
a remnant of  the Sykes-Picot agreement between colonial France and Britain to 
divide up the Arab lands after the collapse of  the Ottoman Empire, is seen as a 
symbol of  Western ‘crusader’ control and the deliberate division of  Muslim lands, 
and a roadblock to the return of  the Caliphate. In an article called ‘The Birth of  
Two New Wilayat’ in Dabiq Issue 4, sums up this idea: 
After demolishing the Syrian/Iraqi border set up by the 
crusaders to divide and disunite the Muslims, and carve up 
their lands in order to consolidate their control of  the region, 
the mujāhidīn of  the Khilāfah delivered yet another blow to 
nationalism and the Sykes-Picot-inspired borders that define 
it. The establishment of  a new wilāyah, Wilāyat al-Furāt, was 
announced this month by the Islamic State in an effort to 
eliminate any remaining traces of  the kufri, nationalistic borders 
from the hearts of  the Muslims.12 
IS’s military advances and re-establishment of  the Caliphate are depicted as 
rolling back old colonial injustices imposed on the Middle East.
10 ‘Foreword’, Dabiq, Issue 7, 2015, p. 3. 
11 Al-Hayat Media Centre, ‘The End of  Sykes-Picot’, video, 2014.
12 ‘The Revival of  Slavery Before the Hour’, Dabiq, Issue 4 (2014) p. 17. 
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It was perhaps Bin Laden who was the most eloquent in his portrayal of  the War 
on Terror as the continuation of  history. In a letter to Al Jazeera in November 
2001, Bin Laden clearly set out his arguments to brand the USA’s response to 
9/11, particularly the American-led invasion of  Afghanistan, as a ‘Crusade 
against Islam’, citing president Bush’s description of  the war as a Crusade to 
make his point.13 Before going on to ask: 
Is it a single, unrelated event, or is it part of  a long series of  
Crusader wars against the Islamic world?  Since World War One, 
which ended over 83 years ago, the entire Islamic world has 
fallen under the Crusader banners, under the British, French, 
and Italian governments. They divided up the whole world 
between them, and Palestine fell into the hands of  the British.14 
Bin Laden presents a perspective through which to view the Afghan invasion—
not as a single event, but as the latest in a long line of  allegedly anti-Muslim 
actions by the West. Having deepened the narrative by connecting the current 
conflict to a long chain of  historical events, he next broadens it citing a litany 
of  violence committed by the ‘Crusaders’ in recent history against multiple 
countries in the Muslim world, including Kashmir, Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya, 
the Philippines, and East Timor, before concluding his argument: ‘We should 
therefore see events not as isolated incidents, but as part of  a long chain of  
conspiracies, a war of  annihilation in all senses of  the word’.15 Bin Laden 
exploits historical narratives to both broaden and deepen the sense of  crisis.
The device of  connecting past and present crises also lies at the heart of  the 
narratives used by the Provisional Irish Republican Movement, or the ‘Provos’.16 
The idea of  the Irish engaged in a continuous struggle throughout their history, 
13 Osama Bin Laden, Bruce B. Lawrence (ed.), and James Howarth (trans.), Messages to the World: The Statements of  
Osama Bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005), p. 128.
14 Bin Laden, p. 136.
15 Bin Laden, p. 137.
16  The Provisional Irish Republican Movement is the branch of  the Irish resistance that was formed after Sinn 
Féin (and it’s military wing, the Irish Republican Army) split in 1970, after violent riots erupted among Catholics 
protesting repression in Northern Ireland in 1969. It consisted of  the Provisional Sinn Féin (its political wing) 
and the Provisional IRA (its military wing). The Provisional branches split off  from the original Sinn Féin and 
IRA because they refused to recognise the legitimacy of  Leinster (Leinster House, Dublin, metonym for the 
government of  the Republic of  Ireland), Stormont (Stormont House, Belfast, metonym for the parliament of  
Northern Ireland, and Westminster (Westminster Palace, London, metonym for the parliament of  the United 
Kingdom), demanding that Northern Ireland be separated from the UK and fully integrated into the Republic 
of  Ireland.  According to Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, then caretaker executive of  Sinn Féin, recognising any of  these 
governments was an ‘act of  treachery’; he is quoted in An Phoblacht, Issue 2, 1970 (see note 17). The official 
policy of  the IRA had been one of  non-violence until ‘the Troubles’, a period of  unrest in Northern Ireland that 
lasted from 1968 to 1998. On 30 January 1972, also known as Bloody Sunday,  the British shot down peaceful 
protesters demonstrating against the internment of  dissidents. This event was a catalyst for increased violence on 
the part of  the resistance as well as government repressions.
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a theme endemic to the Irish national identity, was renewed in Northern Ireland 
during the late 1960’s, when the Irish Republican Army justified its actions 
by exploiting existing nationalist ideologies, beliefs, and traditions. As James 
Downey17 noted, ‘The claim of  a Provo supporter, that the Provos are fighting 
the last campaign to end eight hundred years of  British oppression may seem 
equally unreal; but there has been enough real oppression over the centuries to 
give force to that belief.’18 This quote describes the ideology of  the Provisional 
Movement, which successfully drew on historical claims throughout their 
campaign.19 Throwing off  the yoke of  the occupying force has been intrinsic to 
the Irish struggle, and one the Provisional branch consistently reiterated in their 
public communications as the only solution to the ‘Irish Question’. This was 
clearly illustrated in the Éire Nua20 policy document: ‘Sinn Féin has never looked 
on the ending of  British Rule in Ireland as the end in itself, but rather as a means 
to restore the ownership of  Ireland to the people of  Ireland’.21 
This idea was reiterated in the first issue of  An Phoblacht,22 published in January 
1970, immediately after the split in the Republican Movement. The headline 
on page one read ‘On this we stand, the rock of  the Republic’,23 signalling they 
would not be moved. In short, the Provisional IRA framed the Troubles as a 
continuation of  the centuries-old fight against British occupation.
Summary
In order to expand the sense of  crisis, propagandists exploit historical narratives 
by means of  ‘temporal stretching’. Through connecting a current crisis to past 
events, the propagandist can present the current crisis as something bigger, 
the latest manifestation of  an ongoing struggle. Thus the narratives in militant 
Islamism and the Irish Republican movement both portray their struggles as 
17 James Downey was a former London editor of  the Irish Times, whose work focused on the politics of  North-
ern Ireland.
18 James Downey, Them & Us: Britain-Ireland and the Northern Question 1969–1982, (Dublin: Ward River Press, 
1983), p. 18.
19 Robert A. White, Out of  the Ashes: An Oral History of  the Provisional Irish Republican Movement, (Kildare: Merrion 
Press, 2017). 
20 Éire Nua [New Ireland]: The Social and Economic Program of  Sinn Féin, policy document first published in 
January 1971, proposed a plan for uniting Northern Ireland with the Republic while instituting a devolution and 
federalisation of  government to allow some home rule to the Ulster Protestant and unionist population. Éire 
Nua was reprinted in Freedom Struggle, a book published under the pseudonym P. O’Neill by the (Provisional) 
Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, [Dublin], 1973.
21 Éire Nua Booklet (Dublin: Irish Republican Publicity Bureau ,1972), p. 3. 
22 An Phoblacht [The Republic] was the newspaper published by the (Provisional) Irish Republican Publicity 
Bureau, funded by those who formed the new Provisional wing of  Sinn Féin; Ruairí Ó Brádaigh (Chairman) 
made it his mission to get the publication out quickly, before the split, to publicise the branch’s objectives; see 
White, Out of  the Ashes.
23  ‘On This We Stand: The Rock of  the Republic’, An Phoblacht, February 1970, p. 1.
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the latest stage of  centuries- old conflicts. Doing so heightens the perception 
of  crisis: current events are not viewed in isolation, but as part of  a broader 
historical struggle. This in turn allows the framing of  crisis as something that is 
not transient, but a perpetual state, and hence only extreme action will be able 
to overcome it.
Solution Support
Thus far we have concentrated on the crisis; however, the crisis/solution 
dichotomy relies equally on the believability of  the ‘solution’. The propagandist 
must demonstrate beyond doubt that the ‘solution’ is feasible and presents a 
practical alternative to the status quo. Here again, historical narratives can play 
a key role, invariably by allowing the propaganda to point to a time in history 
when the proposed ‘solution’ had been in place, thus providing evidence that it 
is feasible and effective—as acute as the crisis is now, and may have been in the 
past, it has been overcome before and therefore can be overcome again.
At the heart of  IS propaganda, juxtaposed against the existential crisis Islam 
faces in its war against the crusader West, is the group’s solution, the restoration 
of  the Caliphate. It is endemic throughout their propaganda that re-establishing 
the Caliphate is not only the central objective, but is necessary for achieving 
all of  their other objectives. As stated in the first issue of  Dabiq, ‘The goal 
of  establishing the Khilafah [Caliphate] has always been one that occupied the 
hearts of  the mujahidin since the revival of  jihad this century.’24 Similarly, the 
author of  the article ‘Khilafah Declared’, which celebrates the re-establishment 
of  the Caliphate in the parts of  Syria/Iraq it controlled, jubilantly exclaims, ‘O 
Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, 
for today—by Allah’s grace—you have a state and Khilafah, which will return 
your dignity, might, rights, and leadership.’25
IS propaganda constantly refers to the Prophet Mohammed and the foundation 
of  the original Caliphate, presenting this period as the ideal to return to, for it 
was a time of  military and cultural dominance for the Islamic ummah. The first 
Caliphate is frequently praised, for example in Dabiq 14: 
[B]y the time of  the death of  Allah’s Messenger, the tribes of  
Arabia were almost completely united with all traces of  idolatry 
in the region virtually erased, a phenomenon unknown to 
24 ‘From Hijrah to Khilafah’ Dabiq, Issue 1, 2014, p. 34.
25 ‘Khalifa Declared’, Dabiq, Issue 1, 2014, p. 7.
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historians before that time. Within decades, the impoverished 
and malnourished few thousand herders, date palm farmers, and 
trading travelers—the greatest, most knowledgeable, and most 
pious generations of  the Ummah—plowed through the Roman 
and Persian empires to become literal masters of  lands and 
people from the Iberian Peninsula to the Himalayas.26 
The parallels drawn here are clear: when the first Caliphate was declared the 
impossible became possible, and this can happen again. The re-establishment 
of  the Caliphate is the first step to victory. This is further elaborated upon in an 
article in issue 13 of  Rumiyah:
In other words, the religion of  Allah became manifest and 
triumphant over the kuffar when a state was established for the 
Muslims whose foundations were laid down and fixed firmly 
by Allah’s Messenger and then the rightly-guided khulafa after 
him. And likewise, the Khalifah of  the Muslims and his soldiers 
undertake this matter today, with the support of  Allah, so the 
achievement of  victory and honor for the Muslims cannot be 
imagined without the establishment of  the Islamic State, which 
has revived the rightly-guided Khilafah.27 
IS draws upon the greatest achievements of  the Islamic empire for their 
recruitment narratives to instil the idea that it can re-establish the glorious 
period under which the ummah overcame the Crusaders.
To strengthen the appeal of  an IS-run Caliphate, the group’s propaganda draws 
on previous Islamic Caliphates, often taking specific examples from different 
Caliphates as alternatives to the current international system. For example, in an 
article referencing the economic crisis of  the West at the time and in particular 
currency instability, IS announces the establishment of  their own currency, the 
gold Dinar, citing the Islamic Dinar of  the Umayyad empire:  
The Islamic dinar appeared in 696 AD, when the Umayyad 
empire—based in Damascus—stretched from the Iberian 
peninsula to the Indus River in South Asia […]. Last month the 
Islamic State announced plans to mint their own range of  gold 
dinars and silver dirhams in a move to separate themselves from 
dollar-linked fiat currencies and to establish their own money, a 
currency that has intrinsic value.28
26  ‘Kill the Imams of  Kufr in the West’, Dabiq, Issue 14, 2016, p. 12. 
27 Rumiyah, ‘The Position of  Imamah in Religion’, Issue 13, 2017, p. 17.
28 Dabiq, ‘Meltdown – John Cantlie’, Issue 6, 2014, p. 58. 
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By aligning themselves with the Umayyad Caliphate, IS position themselves as 
a legitimate state.
Proposing a solution to the current crisis was also intrinsic to the appeal of  the 
Provisional IRA. The solution they put forward drew on the vision mapped 
out by their Republican predecessors, one that called for the restoration of  
Ireland’s four provinces, otherwise known as the ‘Four Green Fields’.29 In Éire 
Nua, the Provisionals presented a solution that proposed four democratically 
elected provincial governments (based on the historical Irish provinces of  Dáil 
Laighean, Uladh, Mumhan, and Connacht, anglicised as Leinster, Ulster, Munster, 
and Connacht). The Provisionals’ proposals picked holes in the existing status 
quo and presented an inclusive solution they believed none of  the governments 
in Dublin, Stormont, or Westminster could provide. Their political solution, 
which proposed ‘Catholic, Protestant, Orange and Green, Left and Right’30 to 
be represented within this provincial system, echoes that of  Theobald Wolfe 
Tone’s vision for the island a century past, in which a ‘Catholic, Protestant and 
Dissenter could retain their identity and still find common identity in Irishmen’.31
Summary
As shown above, historical narratives can be used to support the called-for 
solution. Historical examples are brought forward to support and legitimise 
grounds for the proposed solution. Furthermore, historical examples can be 
used to strengthen the case that the proposed solution is actually feasible. The 
more plausible the solution appears when juxtaposed against the Crisis, the 
greater the dichotomy.
Reinforcing the In-group/Out-group Dynamic
The second of  the two dichotomies in the system of  meaning is the in-group/
out-group dynamic. As with the crisis/solution construct, the greater the 
dichotomy appears, the stronger the impact. Here again, history provides a 
reservoir of  evidence that can be cherry-picked and exploited in support of  
the extremist narrative. In particular, there are two ways in which historical 
narratives can be employed to strengthen the in-group/out-group dynamic: the 
29 The Four Green Fields is an Irish folk song widely known, where the ‘four green fields’ are a reference to 
Ireland’s four historic provinces on the island.  
30 Éire Nua [translated as ‘New Ireland’] p.2, policy document published in July 1972 by the Provisional move-
ment’s publicity bureau outlining their proposed plans for political, social and economic progression in their 
vision of  a unified federalised Irish state.  
31 An Phoblacht, 1972, Issue 4, p. 8, this very quote from Wolfe Tone was reiterated again in An Phoblacht issue 
that year.
91
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 4 | Spring 2018
DOI 10.30966/2018.RIGA.4.3.
first is to provide evidence of  the lineage of  the two groups, and the second 
is to show the historical nature of  the struggle between them. The latter has 
obvious parallels to the crisis-expansion narratives outlined above, where a crisis 
is portrayed as part of  an ongoing historical struggle; it is slightly different in 
that it often focuses on demonstrating the ‘characters’ of  the opposing groups.
At the root of  most nationalist movements is a narrative of  a separate ethnic 
identity that marks the foundation of  the nation. Invariably, history is drawn 
upon to show the uniqueness of  this ethnic group and often its superiority to 
other nations or races. In his infamous book Mein Kampf, Adolf  Hitler outlines 
his Nazi ideology, writing at length of  the German people descending from the 
Aryan race, and drawing examples from history to support his claim of  their 
superiority. In Chapter 11, on ‘Race and People’, he asserts: ‘History furnishes 
us with innumerable instances that prove this law. It shows, with a startling 
clarity, that whenever Aryans have mingled their blood with that of  an inferior 
race the result has been the downfall of  the people who were the standard-
bearers of  a higher culture.’ As evidence, he claims that North America has 
come to dominate the the American continents because ‘in North America the 
Teutonic element, [...] has kept its racial stock pure and did not mix it with any 
other racial stock’, in contrast to Central and South America.32 
This narrative of  in-group superiority was completed by pitching the assigned 
out-group, the common enemy—the Jew. Hitler declared: ‘The Jew offers the 
most striking contrast to the Aryan.’33 The ‘inferiority’ and the ‘treachery’ of  the 
Jews is constantly contrasted with the superiority of  the Aryan race, cementing 
the in-group/out-group dynamic. Hitler draws upon numerous examples from 
history to demonise the Jews as the out-group, and to impress upon the reader 
that this alleged nature of  the Jews is not a new phenomenon, but has remained 
unchanged through history, a permanent, immutable, and indisputable fact. He 
connects the alleged actions of  the Jews in the present to biblical stories. For 
instance, he writes: ‘the Founder of  Christianity made no secret indeed of  His 
estimation of  the Jewish people. When He found it necessary He drove those 
enemies of  the human race out of  the Temple of  God; because then, as always, 
they used religion as a means of  advancing their commercial interests.’34 Hitler 
consistently attempted to show alleged Jewish prejudices of  his own day as a 
permanent fact, unchanging through history. 
32 Hitler, Adolf, James Murphy (trans.), ‘Mein Kampf ’, Volume 1: Chapter 11 (London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd., 
1939)
33 Hitler, p. 170. 
34 Hitler, p. 174.
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We see, then, that in Mein Kampf, Hitler uses historical narratives effectively 
to strengthen the in-group/out-group dynamic. By tracing the lineage of  the 
German people back to the Aryans, he employs a historical narrative to define 
the in-group, firmly drawing the line dividing them from the out-group—there 
are no shades of  grey. Furthermore, he uses historical examples as evidence to 
support the superiority of  the German people. Next, he clearly defines the Jews 
as the out-group and uses historical examples to demonise them. He subjectively 
draws his examples from history to give the perception of  the ‘Jewish character’ 
as fixed; that they have always been this way, and by inference they will always be 
this way, and are unable to change. The reference to Jesus driving the Jews out 
of  the temple is used to connect an event two millennia ago to the present-day 
Jews. 
Another good example of  reinforcing the in-group/out-group dynamic using 
historical narratives can be found in British Israelism, which became more 
extreme over time, mutating into Christian Identity extremist groups. At the 
heart of  the Christian Identity narrative is the belief  that Anglo-Saxons are the 
true heirs of  God’s covenant, and are his chosen people rather than the Jews. 
What started out as a belief  that the Anglo-Saxons where one of  lost tribes 
of  Israel, evolved over time into the belief  that they are the only true heirs as 
God’s chosen people, and that the ‘Jews’ are imposters. As J.M. Berger sums up: 
‘While there are many variations on the ideology, adherents of  Christian Identity 
broadly believe members of  the “white race” are the Chosen People of  God 
described in the Christian Bible, and that other races are impure and part of  
a genetic lineage that can be traced directly to Satan or to Satanic influences.’35 
Christian Identity uses a narrative based on historical events, folklore, scripture, 
and biblical genealogies to justify the in-group/out-group dynamic. On the 
one hand it is used to legitimise the in-group, the Anglo-Saxons, and on the 
other hand to de-legitimise the out-group, the Jews (and later, other races). To 
demonstrate that the Anglo-Saxons are indeed God’s chosen people, a complex 
historical theory was woven: that one of  the lost tribes of  Israel migrated 
westward, and from them, unknowingly, the Anglo-Saxons are descended. The 
lost tribes are distinct from the present day Jewish people, and as such they are 
the true heirs to God’s promises. In short, through pseudo-scholarly techniques, 
the adherents of  Christian Identity aimed to increase their in-group legitimacy 
by ‘demonstrating’ that the Anglo-Saxons are in reality the true heirs to the 
35 Berger, ‘Extremist Construction of  Identity’, p. 9.
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‘biblical covenants and promises of  greatness’.36 In delegitimising, and ultimately 
demonising the out-group, Christian Identity maintains that the Jewish people 
are in reality descended from Satan—the ‘seed of  the serpent’. They argue that 
the Jews are descended from Cain, the Bible’s first murderer, and Cain was not 
the son of  Adam, but the offspring of  Eve and the serpent from the Garden 
of  Eden, Satan himself.37 Satanic descent is ultimately expanded to include all 
non-Anglo-Saxon races as descended from the same line.
In short, by writing their own interpretation of  history, the Christian Identity 
theorists provide an apparently solid structure for their pre-defined in-group 
and out-group. History provides the linkage to connect today’s in-group and 
out-group back to the Bible. This process imbues the Christian Identity doctrine 
with the cultural capital of  being derived from such a sacred text. It deepens the 
notion of  the division of  the in-group from the out-group by tracing it back to 
the beginning of  time, simultaneously specifying with exactness who belongs to 
which group—there is no grey zone.
In their own way, the provisional IRA also used history to reinforce the in-
group/out-group dynamic, through on the one hand portraying their fight as 
the continued historic struggle of  the Irish against the British occupiers, and on 
the other providing a historical narrative arguing that the foundation of  many 
problems in the island of  Ireland are due to external interference by the British 
over the last centuries. Throughout the literature of  the Provisional movement, 
there was consistent reference to the English coloniser, the imperial occupier, as 
the ultimate root of  all Ireland’s problems. 
Examples such as the Norman and English wars of  conquest from 1100 to 1850 
continued to provide a source of  legitimation to the Republican movement 
for generations.38 Crisis re-enforcing narratives added weight to these claims 
by depicting all of  Ireland’s problems as coming from these earlier waves of  
colonisation. Similarly, the great Irish famine of  the 1840s is often cited as a result 
of  English ‘maladministration’, which allowed a cruel culling of  half  of  Ireland’s 
population.39 Crops continued to be exported from a deprived population to 
feed the interests of  the occupier, something a ‘native’ administration would 
have never allowed.40 By connecting these past events to the out-group, the 
British occupier, the narrative creates the perception of  a pattern of  behaviour. 
36 Ibid., p. 11.
37 Ibid., p. 33.
38 White, Out of  the Ashes.
39 Downey, Them & Us, p. 32.
40 Ibid.
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This re-enforces the in-group/ out-group dynamic by connecting the present 
to the past, creating a sense of  permanence for the in-group/out-group divide.
Summary
Historical narratives can be used to strengthen the in-group/out-group dynamic 
in two main ways. First, the narrative is used to provide the lineage of  both 
groups in order to define clearly which people belong to which group. Second, 
by connecting the current conflict to historical events, the narrative establishes a 
perception of  permanence—that such an in/out group dynamic is unchanging 
and the normal order of  things. The implication is that if  it has always been like 
this, only extreme action will make a change.
Legitimacy and Credibility—Standing on the Shoulders of  Giants 
The source of  information, and particularly the credibility of  the source, play 
an important role in the effectiveness of  communications—the messenger 
is as important as the message. The foundations of  effective strategic 
communications at the macro-level are the three Rs—Reach, Relevance, and 
Resonance. This in turn relies on the meso-level comprised of  the Messenger, 
Message, and Medium of  the communications; all three aspects are required 
for communications to be effective.41 There is much supporting research across 
several fields exploring how the perception of  the source of  information can 
shape the way the message itself  is interpreted and processed.42
Hence an important aspect of  extremist propaganda is to present the extremists, 
and especially their leaders, as credible messengers. Extremist groups are often 
lead by ‘charismatic leaders’, who present themselves as powerful and credible 
messengers. Such leaders often emphasise developing their identity and image, 
to increase their charismatic appeal. One way of  doing this is to build on the 
charismatic capital of  previous leaders, by drawing linkages through symbolism 
or quotations between past and present leaders. In this way they can claim 
to belong to a lineage of  revered leaders. Ingram labels this ‘transformative 
charisma’, in which the charismatic capital of  past leaders is drawn upon to 
bolster current leaders.43
41 For a full discussion see: Haroro Ingram and Alastair Reed, ‘Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism 
Strategic Communications’, The Hague International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016.
42 Haroro Ingram, ‘Deciphering the Siren Call of  Militant Islamist Propaganda: Meaning, Credibility & Be-
havioural Change’, The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Vol. 7, № 9, (2016): 19.
43 Haroro Ingram, The Charismatic Leadership Phenomenon in Radical and Militant Islamism (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2013).
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In his book The Charismatic Leadership Phenomenon in Radical and Militant Islamism, 
Ingram traces a long line of  charismatic leaders within militant Islamism, who 
have all built on the charismatic capital of  their predecessors to enhance their 
image and identity, and so come to embody the system of  meaning. Ingram 
explains that al-Qaeda founder Bin Laden ‘emerged by not only drawing upon 
charismatic predecessors such as Azzam and Qutb but by surrounding himself  
with older Islamists with decades of  experience in their regionally-based 
struggles (for example, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Muhammad Atef) to increase his 
own charismatic capital’.44 Similarly, Bin Laden would cite medieval theologian 
Ibn Taymiyyah to back up his assertions and create an aura of  legitimacy. More 
directly, he also deliberately tried to embody the warrior-scholar image of  his 
mentor Azzam.45
These trends are still prevalent in contemporary Islamist groups. Both al-Qaeda 
and IS constantly refer to leaders from decades and centuries past to appropriate 
their charismatic capital, weaving past and present into one continuity of  
identity. This technique is used in Inspire magazine (published by al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]), in the sections on ‘History and Strategy’, and in 
Dabiq magazine (published by IS), in ‘From the Pages of  History’. For example, 
Inspire carries a regular feature called ‘Words of  Wisdom’ presenting quotations 
from prominent Jihadi leaders, including such revered past leaders as sheikh 
Abdallah Azzam, Sayyed Qutb, and the ‘blind sheikh’ Umar Abdul Rahman.46 
This is a clear attempt to situate AQAP as the heirs to their work.
In the same section, prominent Islamist ideologue and strategist Abu Mus’ab 
al-Suri writes a series of  articles called ‘The Jihadi Experiences’.47 Here, he 
provides a critique of  past jihadist campaigns in ‘Jihādī Current (1963–2001)’, in 
which he identifies successful and unsuccessful strategies. Al-Suri promotes the 
strategies used in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, and outlines his military 
theory of  the Global Islamic Resistance Call. These articles portray the efforts 
of  AQAP as a continuation of  the same struggle of  the last six decades of  Jihad.
Similarly, in IS’s Dabiq, articles ‘From the Pages of  History’ give other examples. 
The article, ‘Lessons from the Fitnah of  the Mongols’, from Dabiq 14, provides 
selected quotes from influential 13th century theologian Shaykh ul-Islām Ibn 
Taymiyyah from the time of  the Mongol invasion, in which ‘[t]he shaykh draws 
44 Ibid., p. 193.
45 Ibid., p. 193–94.
46 See ‘Words of  Wisdom’, Inspire, Issues 11, 13, 14, 15, and 17.
47 See ‘The Jihadi Experiences’, in Inspire, Issues 1, 2, 4, 5 ,6, 8, 9, 10, and 12
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comparisons between the Battle of  al-Ahzāb in the time of  the Prophet and 
the fitnah of  Ghazan, presenting lessons for the believers that will continue to 
remain relevant and crucial until the camp of  īmān defeats the camp of  kufr 
once and for all.’48 Another article in the same series, ‘The Expeditions, Battles, 
and Victories of  Ramadan’, recounts the victorious battles in which the Prophet 
participated or led during Ramadan.49
The Provisional IRA also drew legitimacy from linking their struggle to those 
of  their predecessors, from Wolfe Tone (1753–98), known as ‘the father of  
Irish Republicanism’, to the many leaders of  the 1916 Easter Rising, including 
James Connolly and Patrick Pearse. Referring to these revolutionary leaders was 
not exclusive to the Provisional movement; they, like others, used this device to 
legitimise and strengthen their renewed struggle. 
The Provisionals’ claim to be heirs of  Wolfe Tone is exemplified in the second 
issue of  An Phoblacht (1970), released just prior to the anniversary of  the Easter 
Rising. The article entitled ‘What the 1916 Rising Meant’ makes reference to 
Wolfe’s ‘gospel’, which was to ‘break the connection with England, the never-
failing source of  all our political evils’.50
The Provisionals here also claim that their Republican counterparts are incapable 
of  being the heirs to this on-going struggle. Thereby they link to the crisis not only 
the classic out-group (the English), but also members of  the in-group (other Irish 
republicans). This is evidenced in the same column, where they claim: 
If, to-day, men hold commemorations of  Easter week and at the 
same time support and uphold the British conquest in Ireland, 
they are as Pearse would describe them ‘tyrants, hypocrites, 
liars’. There are a number of  groups claiming to be Republican 
who support the maintenance of  two partitioned states.51
The column ends with a plea to followers to continue supporting only the 
goals of  the Provisional branch: to refuse to recognise any group that should 
deny Ireland its right to a unified government. ‘So on this Easter Sunday, as we 
gather around the graves of  our martyred dead we should again repudiate all 
institutions, which would limit the complete sovereignty of  Ireland.’ 52
48 Dabiq, ‘Lessons From The Fitnah of  the Mongols’, Issue 14, 2016, pp. 44–49.
49 Dabiq, ‘From the Pages of  History’, Issue 10, 2015, pp. 26–29.
50 Art Ó Baoill, ‘What the 1916 Rising Meant’, An Phoblacht, March 1970, Volume 1, Issue 2, p. 4.
51 Ibid.
52  Ibid.
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Summary
The messenger is as important as the message, as the perceived legitimacy and 
credibility of  the messenger greatly impact how a message is interpreted. To 
increase their apparent legitimacy and credibility, the leaders of  extremist groups 
frequently link themselves to past revered leaders, presenting themselves as their 
heirs. In this way they appropriate ‘cultural capital’ to support their claims of  
legitimacy.                
Back to the Future: The Role of  Prophecy 
Whilst the previous sections have outlined how historical narratives can be 
exploited to strengthen different aspects of  a system of  meaning, sometimes 
history alone is not enough. Historical narratives are used as evidence to support 
a group’s arguments and narratives, or to connect the current circumstances to 
some greater inter-generational struggle—connecting the present to the past. 
Another technique used by the propagandist is the exploitation of  historical 
prophecies—connecting the present to the future. Together these make a very 
strong tool: the group is portrayed as rooted in history, looking to the future, 
and tied to the divine. 
The Christian Identity movement exploits biblical prophecies extensively to 
justify its narrative. First, it re-interprets history through the lens of  biblical 
prophecies, using suitably realised prophecies to assert its legitimacy. For 
example, early British Israelist J.H. Allen first traced the lineage of  the Anglo-
Saxons back to the biblical figure of  Ephraim, and then interpreted the prophecy 
that Ephraim would father ‘many nations’53 as a reference to the British Empire. 
Similarly, he goes on to link the prophecy of  another biblical figure, Manasseh, 
whose descendants would go on to form ‘a great nation’,54 to the United States.55 
Connecting the ‘in-group’ to supposed realised prophecies creates a false sense 
of  truth and legitimacy in their narratives. 
As it evolved, the Christian Identity movement became more extreme, and 
increasingly focussed on the unfulfilled prophecies of  the Book of  Revelation 
and on millenarian sentiments fuelled by the recent world wars and the cold war. 
This new focus connecting unfulfilled apocalyptic prophecies to the present 
and near future, created a sense of  urgency. In his analysis of  Christian Identity 
53 Genesis 48:19
54 Ibid.
55 Berger, ‘Extremist Construction of  Identity’, p. 11–12.
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ideology, J.M. Berger described this combination of  historical narratives and 
future prophecies as producing  ‘a sort of  Doppler Effect—as adherents rush 
from an increasingly expansive history toward an increasingly compressed 
timeline for a near-future upheaval of  the world order, imbuing the out-group 
threat with an apocalyptic sense of  urgency’.56
When al-Qaeda central (AQC) launched its most recent affiliate, al-Qaeda in 
the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), in September 2014, the narrative they used 
referred to the hadith57 prophecy about Ghazwa al-Hind [Battle of  India], which 
foretells the Muslim conquest of  India58 and promises those who take part the 
reward of  a place in paradise.59 The group’s first major attack, at the Naval 
shipyard in Karachi in September 2014, was heralded as ‘a clear message to 
India that Ghazwa-e-Hind has only just begun’.60 However, the exploitation of  
this particular narrative is nothing new, and has been a mainstay of  Jihadist 
groups in the sub-continent since 1988, when they emerged in Indian-controlled 
Kashmir.61 The prophecy is used to cast the groups’ actions as part of  a larger, 
inevitable conflict, and seemingly demonstrate their legitimacy because they are 
fulfilling a prophecy. 
The Ghazwa al-Hind prophecy, is not the only hadith prophecy to be exploited by 
militant Islamists in South Asia. Husain Haqqani describes the another passage 
uses in the 1980s Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan:
During the war against the Soviets and the ensuing Taliban 
rule, ancient prophecies of  Khurasan—which includes modern 
Afghanistan—resurfaced to inspire jihadists and promise 
great heavenly rewards. These prophecies foreshadowed 
the appearance of  the Mahdi or Messiah and the final battle 
between good (pure Islam) and evil before judgement day. 
According to one Hadith, an army with black flags would 
emerge from Khurasan to help the Mahdi establish his caliphate 
at Mecca.62 
56 Berger, ‘Extremist Construction of  Identity’, p. 46. 
57 The Hadiths are the oral traditions attributed to the prophet Muhammad. 
58 The ‘battle for India’ is usually taken to refer to an area far bigger than the modern day nation state of  India, 
including the land today covered by Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Kashmir, Myanmar and Bangladesh (and 
more). 
59 Alastair Reed, ‘Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent: A New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement?’, 
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, (2016), p. 7; Arif  Rafiq, ‘The New Al-Qaeda Group in South Asia Has 
Nothing To Do With ISIS’, New Republic, 5 September 2014; Husain Haqqani, ‘Prophecy and the Jihad in the 
Indian Subcontinent’, Washington DC, Hudson Institute, 27 March 2015.
60 Reed, Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent, p. 8; Haqqani, ‘Prophecy and the Jihad’.
61 Ibid.
62 Haqqani, ‘Prophecy and the Jihad’.
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The emergence of  an army waving the black flag of  jihad, was thought to 
support the idea that the Afghan jihad would be the first step toward fulfilling 
the prophecy.
Perhaps the most infamous use of  prophecies in recent extremist propaganda 
is the Islamic State’s use of  apocalyptic prophecies drawn from the Koran and 
Hadiths, which were to play a central role in the group’s narrative. One of  the 
group’s glossy English language propaganda magazines was called ‘Dabiq’, itself  
a direct reference to an end-of-times prophecy according to which Dabiq, a 
town in northern Syria, is the location of  the final confrontation between the 
Muslim armies and the Roman Crusaders, after which victorious Muslim armies 
will march on Constantinople and then on Rome, ushering in the end times. The 
introduction to the first issue of  Dabiq states:
According to the hadith, the area will play a historical role in 
the battles leading up to the conquests of  Constantinople, then 
Rome. Presently, Dabiq is under the control of  crusader-backed 
sahwat, close to the warfront between them and the Khilafah. 
May Allah purify Dabiq from the treachery of  the sahwah and 
raise the flag of  the Khilafah over its land.63  
This passage links the rise of  IS and its present day campaign of  violence 
directly to the prophecy. A quote from AQI founder Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi is 
printed at the start of  each issue: ‘The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat 
will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permission—until it burns the crusader 
armies in Dabiq’.
The temporary defeat and occupation of  Dabiq by IS forces provided a 
propaganda double whammy. First, raising the flag of  the Khilafah in Dabiq 
seemingly proved the group’s legitimacy, as it was seen as the first step towards 
fulfilling the prophecy. Second, this implied the realisation of  the prophecy 
was close at hand; the final battle against the armies of  the crusaders and the 
conquest of  Constantinople and Rome were within reach. This belief  generated 
an urgency to act—the time is now, the end times are upon us, action cannot be 
delayed. To increase this sense of  urgency, the group high-lighted other events 
in the prophecies, such as the restoration of  slavery after the declaration of  
the Caliphate, to strengthen the notion that the prophecies’ fulfilment was fast 
approaching. As laid out in the article ‘The Revival of  Slavery Before the Hour’ 
63 Dabiq, ‘Introduction’, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 3–4. 
100
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 4 | Spring 2018
DOI 10.30966/2018.RIGA.4.3.
in Dabiq 4, ‘it is interesting to note that slavery has been mentioned as one of  the 
signs of  the Hour as well as one of  the causes behind al-Malhamah al-Kubrā’.64 
Summary
Extremist propaganda exploits prophecies in three ways. First, it uses prophecies 
that seemingly have been realised to establish legitimacy, i.e. prophesied events 
have come true in the past and will come true again. Second, it uses prophecies 
to support carrying out a certain type of  action, for doing this will fulfil the 
prophecy, i.e. the use of  self-fulfilling prophecy. Third, it uses prophecies to 
predict an imminent future event, often apocalyptic, to create an urgency to act. 
While historical narratives are used to support and justify extremist ideology, 
prophecies can be exploited to create the need to act now!
Conclusions
In this article, we have aimed to provide insight into how historical narratives 
are exploited by extremist propagandists to strengthen their overarching group 
narratives. This paper drew on examples of  extremist groups, each of  which in 
its own way provides compelling examples of  propaganda. The purpose of  the 
paper was not to compare these groups, as they differ greatly in their ideologies, 
motivations, and operations. Instead, the paper applied Ingram’s linkage 
approach and concept of  a competitive system of  meaning as an analytical 
lens to investigate how each of  these disparate groups uses the techniques to 
strengthen its system of  meaning.  
This they did in five ways: 
● First, in order to expand the sense of  crisis, the current crisis is 
connected to past events to create a sense of  temporal stretching 
in which current events are not viewed in isolation, but as part as 
something bigger, the latest stage in an on-going historic struggle. 
● Second, solution support in which historical examples are used to 
support the argument for the proposed solution. The examples 
demonstrate that the ‘solution’ is actually feasible. 
● Third, historical narratives can be used to reinforce the in-group/
out-group dynamic, in two ways—by using history to trace the lineage 
of  both groups to show who belongs in which group and to provide 
legitimacy to the in-group’s claims, and by connecting the current 
64 Dabiq, ‘The Revival of  Slavery Before The Hour’,Issue 4 (2014), p.14 
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conflict to past events to reinforce the perception of  a permanent 
struggle between the two groups. 
● Fourth, by using historical narratives to strengthen the legitimacy 
and credibility of  the messenger, and therefore the impact of  the 
message. To this end the leadership of  extremist groups frequently 
link themselves to past revered leaders, presenting themselves as their 
heirs, thus appropriating their ‘cultural capital’ to support their claims 
of  legitimacy.       
● Finally, extremist propaganda can make use of  historical prophecies 
in one of  three ways: first, by connecting past events to historical 
prophecies, the fulfilment of  which serves to establish their legitimacy; 
second to justify carrying out a certain action because this would fulfil 
a given prophecy, and third, by using an impending crisis predicted by a 
prophecy to create a sense of  urgency, and therefore a need to act now!
As this paper has shown historical narratives are a very potent tool in the 
hands of  extremist propagandists, that can be applied in a number of  ways 
to strengthen the groups’ narratives. At its most basic, historical narratives 
provide a reservoir of  evidence or data points that can be interwoven to create 
supporting arguments to the extremists’ view point. However, what gives 
historical narratives their potency is their temporal characteristics. The ability 
to connect the present to the past, so that current events are not viewed in 
isolation but as part of  a temporal continuum. In this way today’s conflicts 
are transformed into the latest stage of  an historical struggle, and in-group/
out-group dynamics, are ‘shown’ to be not a new dynamic but a continuous 
or perpetual struggle between two groups. In this way the crisis/solution and 
in-group/out-group dichotomies are deepened, and the links between Crisis + 
In-Group and the Solution + Out-Group are strengthened. 
Future Research
This paper has been exploratory in nature, aiming to show how historical 
narratives are appropriated in extremist propaganda. However, we do not 
pretend that the mechanisms listed above are by any means exhaustive. Further 
research is needed to explore this dynamic, to examine more extremist groups, 
and to identify other ways in which historical narratives are incorporated into 
extremist propaganda. Similarly, as suggested already in this paper, an analysis 
of  the narratives of  the opponents’ of  these extremist groups would be another 
interesting angle to investigate. The next step would be to apply the ideas described 
above to a series of  in-depth case studies on a number of  extremist groups and 
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their opponents. This would help us to better understand the mechanisms used 
by particular groups, but would also allow us to compare extremist groups and 
their opponents. Finally, given the prominence of  historical levers in violent 
extremist propaganda as outlined in this paper, there are also many implications 
for advice regarding strategic communications policy for Counter Terrorism – 
Countering Violent Extremism operations. 
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